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Abstract
T h i s  p a p e r  e x a m i n e s  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  d i r e c t  i n c o m e  p a y m e n t s  o n  p r o -
ductive  efficiency  of  Korean  rice  farms,  using  farm-level  cross s e c -
t i o n a l  d a t a  i n  2 0 0 6 .  F o r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  a n d  i t s  d etermi-
nants, this paper uses a model that estimates the deviations of farms 
f r o m  a  t r a n s l o g  d i s t a n c e  f u n c t i o n  a n d  t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  t h e s e  
deviations.  This  paper  especially  estimates  a  stochastic  frontier  pro-
duction  function  to  explain  deviations  from  best-practice  productivity 
with  a  two-part  error  term  includ i n g  s t a t i s t i c a l  n o i s e  f r o m  m e a sure-
ment  error  and  technical  inefficiency  arising  from  farms  not  reaching 
the  production  frontier  boundary.  The  empirical  evidence  finds  that 
farms that get a higher share of direct payments in farm revenue are 
less  efficient  than  others.  This  inefficiency  is  reduced  by  increases  in 
f a r m  s i z e .  A n o t h e r  r e s u l t  i n d i c a tes  that  farms  received  greater d i r e c t  
payments  on  aggregate  are  more  efficient  than  other  farms  since 
fixed payment, one part of rice direct payment, is tied to the amount 
o f  a  f a r m ' s  c r o p l a n d  t h a t  h a s  b e e n  e n r o l l e d  i n  p r o g r a m s ,  a s  w e l l  as 
yield  histories.
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(Association  of  Regional  Agriculture  and  Forestry  Economics)  International 
Symposium  in  Ishikawa,  Japan  on  October  19-22,  2007.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Direct payments have taken up a larger portion of agricultural policy in many 
countries. The World Trade Organization (WTO) mechanism believes that price 
or product support policies have distorted production and trade, and con-
sequently demands their reduction or conversion into production-neutral direct 
payment programs. Following the global trend, Korea is expanding the direct 
payment scheme to achieve the goal of agricultural structural reform and protect 
farm household income.
The introduction of Korean direct payment programs has been dis-
cussed since the mid-1990s, but one of the concerns about the programs is that 
the programs would negatively affect agricultural policy goals such as structural 
reform or demand/supply balance, despite the positive effect of compensating 
farm household’s income reduction stemming from agricultural market opening. 
Especially the disputes regarding the relationship between direct payment pro-
grams and agricultural structural reform have evolved around the direct pay-
ment programs for income compensation.
The Korean agriculture is featured by a large number of small-sized 
farms. In this situation, some argue that the expansion of the direct income pay-
ment programs suppresses the leaving of small farms from agriculture, making 
the structural reform effort reversed, and the rice-centric direct income payment 
policy could exacerbate the rice supply glut (Lee, 2000; Lee 2002; Park et al., 
2004).
In addition, others point out that the direct payment programs linked 
to the amount of a farm’s cropland raises farmland rents, thereby restraining the 
farmland mobilization and setting a high barrier to young farmers’ entry into 
the agriculture. In fact, there were such cases where landlords requested the 
grant of the direct income payments to them or raised the rents or even taken 
the land away from the tenanted farmers.
The literature also argues that the direct income payment program for 
rice farming is targeted to farmers cultivating land sized at 0.1ha or above, and 
this has restrained the exit of small farms from the farming, and reversed the 
trend of agricultural structural reform. However, some insist that considering the 
small cost of opportunity given to most small farms managed by old farmers 
and the small amount of direct payments offered to them, it is unnecessary to Impact of Direct Income Payments on Productive Efficiency of Korean Rice Farms 3
raise the minimum amount (Oh and Kim, 2005).
Chau and de Gorter (2000) points out that the AMTA (Agricultural 
Market Transition Assistance) of U.S. has prevented farms from exiting from 
farming due to government subsidy.1 Adams et al. (2001) suggest that direct 
payments might be the cause of production surplus and environmental issues, 
and raises farmland rents, thereby blocking structural reform.
In summary, based on the literature, the arguing points to be clarified 
in defining the relation between direct payment programs and agricultural struc-
tural reform are as follows: 1) Does the direct income payment system suppress 
the leaving of marginal farms from agriculture?; 2) does the direct income pay-
ment program raise farmland rents?; and 3) what impact does the direct income 
payment policy have on the total number of farm households?
Among the arguments surrounding the direct income payment programs 
and agricultural structural reform, this study analyzes the impact of the direct 
payment on production efficiency and structural reform to find out if the direct 
income payment program restrains marginal farms from leaving farming. To 
this end, the focus of analysis is on the direct income payment program for rice 
farming.
Most literature on direct income payments and agricultural structural 
reform tend to depend on on-site case examples, instead of conducting an em-
pirical analysis. More in-depth theories and empirical analyses have been 
lacking. In this regard, unlike other literature, this paper analyzes the impact of 
direct income payments for rice farms on rice productive efficiency using in-
dividual farm-level data in 2006 and derives the implications for agricultural 
structural reform. There are little studies on this issue in Korea.
While the primary objective of this paper is to empirically examine the 
impact of income support direct payment on rice production efficiency for 
Korean rice farms, another important aim is to shed some light on the relation-
ship between direct payment policies and structural reform of the Korean rice 
industry. Gradual liberalization of the rice and other farm commodity markets 
could further enlarge the gap between farm and non-farm incomes, as internal 
prices in Korea are far above potential import prices of many farm commod-
ities, especially rice. Under these situations, the current consensus in Korean ag-
  1 Fixed direct payments (DP) replace production flexibility contract (PFC) payments, 
sometimes  referred  to  as  AMTA  payments.Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 4
riculture is that expansion of individual farmland holdings via exit of marginal 
farmers, a process generally labeled “farm consolidation,” can improve pro-
ductivity and competitiveness through increased productive efficiency (e.g., 
Kim, 1997; Lee, 1998). Many Korean economists argue that low rural income 
in Korea is less the result of depressed prices for agricultural products and more 
the consequence of small farm sizes, or lack of consolidation. Korean govern-
ment policies also seek to expand land holdings per farm through the elimi-
nation of marginal farms and improve productive efficiency. However, income 
support direct payment may induce marginal farms to stay in farming longer, 
thus making difficult the farm consolidation necessary to improve productivity 
and competitiveness in the Korean rice industry.
Until now, public policy in Korean agriculture has been focused on 
boosting rural income with little attention to productivity. Assessing the unex-
plored productivity potential is an important component of evaluating the future 
path of productivity. The previous regime of autarky and considerable govern-
ment interventions helped marginal farmers remain in business. No income sup-
port would be expected to induce some marginal farmers to retire from rice 
farming, which means that average current productivity would be misleading as 
an assessment of the productivity potential. This underscores the relevance of 
frontier methods.
This paper is divided into four sections. Section II specifies the current 
status of Korean direct payments in terms of contents and general effects. 
Section III provides an analytical framework for the impact of direct payment 
on rice production efficiency. Then, to provide a context to our analysis, section 
IV briefly describes the data used here. We then present estimation procedures 
in Section V. The estimated results are presented and discussed in Section VI.  
Conclusions are drawn in the final section.
II. KOREAN DIRECT PAYMENTS
1. Types of Korean direct payments
In 1997, the direct payment program for farm management transfer by aged 
farmers was first introduced in Korea. Since then, the direct payment program Impact of Direct Income Payments on Productive Efficiency of Korean Rice Farms 5
for environment-friendly farming was introduced in 1999, followed by the di-
rect payment program for rice farming in 2001 and the direct payment program 
for rice farming in 2002. In 2005, the income support direct payments for rice 
farms combined by two direct payment programs related to rice were newly 
introduced. Besides, a rice production adjustment program was conducted tem-
porarily for three years from 2003, and a pilot project was launched in 2004 
based on a plan of introducing a direct payment program for environmentally 
friendly livestock farms and a direct payment program for farms located in geo-
graphically less-favored rural areas. Among various direct payment programs, 
the program for rice income support direct payments takes up the largest 
portion.
The introduction of various direct payment programs each year has ex-
panded the related budget amount from KRW 250.9 billion (4.1% of agricul-
tural budget) to KRW 1.14 trillion (13.6% of agricultural budget). Besides, due 
to a sizable growth in variable direct payments in the direct income payment 
system for rice farming, the budget surged as much as 23.4%. The expansion 
of the direct payment program has emerged as a main task of agricultural poli-
cy, and according to the ‘comprehensive measures for agriculture and rural 
areas,’ the direct payment budget was scheduled to rise up to KRW 3.41 trillion 
(22% of agricultural budget).















 60,968   65,491   65,572   66,031   73,406 
Direct payment
budget(billion won)
 2,509   4,289   6,432   8,675   10,014 
Ratio(%)  4.1  6.5  9.8  13.1  13.6 
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As of 2006, six direct payment programs are in place. Mostly, they are 
based on farmland size. For rice paddies, the direct payment programs for rice 
farms, environmentally friendly farming, and management transfer are applied, 
while the ones for geographically less-favored rural areas and environmentally 
friendly farming are applied for uplands. 
TABLE  1.    Direct  payment  programs  in  Korea
Type Beginning 
year Purpose Payment Requirements
① Management 
transfer 1997
- Expand the farm size
- Stabilize the income of retired 
farmers
Farmland sale or 5 
year or above lease
② Environmentally 
friendly farming 1999 - Environment preservation
Compliance with the 
certification criteria of 
environmentally friendly 
agricultural products
③ Rice farming 2001 - Income compensation Maintain the form of 
rice paddies
④ Direct  payments 
for rice farming 2002 - Management stabilization
Joining agreement, con-
tribution payment, and 
price fall below the 
reference price
⑤ Rice  production 
adjustment
2003
- Rice supply/demand balance
- Strongly positioned in the rice 
re-negotiations
3-year mandatory non- 





2004 - Build a sustainable livestock farming
- Produce safe livestock products
Program implementation, 




- Maintain agricultural diversity
- Maintain local community
Village agreement ex-
ecution, village fund 
creation, village vitality 
enhancement
⑧ Landscape 
conservation 2005 - Maintain agricultural landscape




⑨ Income support 
direct payment for 
rice farming:
combination of ③, 
④
2005 - Stabilize rice farm management
Maintain rice paddies’ 
form
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TABLE  2.    Classification  of  current  direct  payment  programs  by  function
Program Description Function
Income support direct payment 
for rice farming  
Compensate the gap between target 
price and market price up to 85%  
Target price: KRW 170,083/80kg
Market price: average supplier price 
during harvesting season  
Income stabilization
Direct payment for 
less-favored rural areas  
Applied to the geographically dis-
advantaged areas with 14% or above 
slant, sign an agreement between local 
governments and villages, create a joint 




for landscape conservation 
Plant and manage landscape crops such 
as rape and buckwheat, sign an agree-




Direct payment for 
environmentally 
friendly agriculture 
Conduct environmentally friendly farm-
ing and make additional payment for 





Direct payment for 
environmentally 
friendly livestock farming  
Secure forage crop plot, use night soil 
for farming, maintain the proper live-




Direct payment for 
management transfer  
Encourage farmers aged from 63 to 69 
years to sell or lease their farmland to 
contribute to the farm size increase of 
3rd parties  
Structural reform
2. Direct payment for stabilizing the income of rice farming 
The income support direct payments for rice farming, which were newly in-
troduced in 2005, did not set a ceiling in the targeted land size unlike previous 
direct payment systems. Instead, the payment consists of the fixed amount de-
termined according to farmland size and the variable amount determined as a 
certain ratio of the gap between target price and market price.
The direct payments for the Korean rice industry are to compensate for 
the income loss resulting from the elimination of the government purchasing 
program which served as a market price support in such a manner as to not Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 8
distort the rice market.  This program consists of two types of direct payments, 
i.e., fixed and variable direct payments. The nature of fixed payment is like 
lump-sum transfer whereas variable payment is price-dependable.
The fixed direct payments introduced in 2005 are a variation of the di-
rect payment system for rice farming introduced in 2001. It is paid for farmland 
maintenance and KRW 700,000/ha was paid in 2006. The farmland targeted in-
clude the farmland used for rice farming from January 1, 1998 to December 
31, 2000. The land should perform the functions of farmland and maintain its 
form as farmland provided that the direct payment is given to rice farmland of 
the concerned year among qualified farmland, and pesticide and chemical fertil-
izer standards should be met.
The variable direct payments are paid only when the market price falls 
below the target price, and the amount of a variable direct payment is found 
by subtracting 85% of the gap between target price and market price by the 
fixed direct payment unit price. Target price is announced by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry considering the average rice price of main rice produc-
ing areas during the harvest season (from October to January of next year). 
Target price is adjusted every three years based on the consent from the Korea 
National Assembly. The target price from 2005 to 2007 is KRW 170,083/80kg. 
The unit price of fixed direct payment is equivalent to the amount found by 
dividing the fixed direct payment by the number of rice bags. For example, if 
61 bags of rice are produced in an area of 1ha, the unit price is KRW 700,000 
/61=KRW 11,475. The variable direct payment is determined as follows: 
Variable direct payment amount =(target price-market price)*0.85-(fixed direct 
payment unit price).
TABLE  3.    Total  area  and  upper  limit  for  fixed  direct  payment
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total area applied for fixed direct payment(1,000ha) 816 852 910 955 998
Payment amount per ha (KRW1,000) 234 467 500 500 600 700
Upper limit for fixed direct payment(ha)   2   2   3   4 - -
Source: Korea Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery (www.maf.go.kr) 
If the market price moves above target price, the variable direct pay-
ment is not paid so that it is very similar to the U.S. Counter-Cyclical Payment 
(CCP). Impact of Direct Income Payments on Productive Efficiency of Korean Rice Farms 9
The fixed direct payment is not linked to production and price so that 
it is put in the green box of the WTO, while the variable direct payment is 
classified as the amber box since it is linked to market price.
The variable payment amount is increasing at a much faster speed than 
the fixed payment amount.  In 2003 when the variable direct payment was first 
introduced, the total spending for variable direct payment was KRW 24.4 bil-
lion, but it surged to KRW 698.6 billion in 2006, 37 times higher than that of 
the first year. The main reason lies in the constant fall of the market price al-
though the target price is fixed for three years. Therefore, one of the problems 
of the fixed and variable direct payments is cited as the rapidly growing finan-
cial burden of the government.
3. Features of Korean direct payments 
3.1. Income support
Despite the increasing budget spending, the income support effect of the direct 
payments remains insignificant.  The direct payment amount per household was 
KRW 509,000 in 2003 and KRW 699,000 in 2004, accounting for only 1.9% 
and 2.4% of the total farm household income respectively.
However, the income support direct payment program for rice farming 
has a relatively high effect on income stabilization. In 2005, the average suppli-
er price of rice was set at KRW 140,028, thus the amount received by farm 
household including direct payments was KRW 165,518 per 80kg. Compared 
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with 2004, this is slightly above the average supplier price (KRW 161,630), but 
below the farm gate price (KRW 170,710).
3.2. Implementation ratio between rice paddies and uplands
In terms of the farmland type applied with the direct payments, the programs 
have been mainly implemented on rice paddies. Under the 2006 implementation 
plan, 90.3% of the total rice paddies (1,105,000 ha) are subjected to the income 
support direct payments for rice farms, management transfers, and environ-
mentally friendly farming.  However, in the case of uplands, only 27.7% are 
subjected to the direct payment for less-favored rural areas and the direct pay-
ment for environmental friendly farming.
FIGURE  3.    Farmland  areas  subject  to  direct  payment,  2006   
Note: ( ) represents areas
Source: Korea Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery (www.maf.go.kr)
3.3. Payment method
Payment amount is determined mostly by farmland size. Excluding environ-
mentally friendly livestock farms, the direct payments are paid based on the 
size of farmland. To determine the amount, the payment unit per ha is set and 
it is applied nationwide.Impact of Direct Income Payments on Productive Efficiency of Korean Rice Farms 11
III. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This paper applies a parametric stochastic frontier function to measure the pro-
ductive (or technical) efficiencies of farms in Korea.2 Frontier estimation mod-
els allow the measurement of farm specific indices of technical efficiency, 
which may be interpreted as multilateral indices of total factor productivity 
(Caves et al., 1982; Page, 1984)3. Frontier econometric techniques also explain 
deviations from best-practice productivity with  a two-part error term including 
statistical noise from measurement error and technical inefficiency arising from 
farms not reaching the production frontier boundary. A parametric stochastic 
approach recognizes inherent randomness in production due to variations in 
weather and other conditions. Due to such unpredictability, this study uses the 
parametric stochastic approach to estimate the technical efficiency of farms. 
This contrasts with typical econometric approaches that fit a function through 
the data assuming a normal error distribution, and with nonparametric or de-
terministic econometric frontier approaches that limit statistical inference (Paul 
et al., 2000).
For representation of efficiency and its determinants, this paper uses a 
model that estimates the deviations of farms from a production function and the 
determinants of these deviations. Direct payment is used as an independent vari-
able in explaining the efficiency scores from the frontier. Instead of the com-
monly used multi-stage estimation technique (e.g., Wan, 1992), the simulta-
neous estimation procedure of Battese and Coelli (1995) is employed. This pro-
cedure yields efficient and consistent parameter estimates for the production 
function as well as the function relating technical efficiency to its determinants.
  2 Since our panel data do not include prices, productivity efficiency is measured using 
a  primal  method  that  does  not  require  price data.  Thus, productive  efficiency  can 
be also called as technical efficiency in this study. Technical efficiency is a purely 
physical notion that can be measured without price information and without having 
to  impose  a  behavioral  objective  function  on  producers.  Cost,  revenue,  and  profit 
efficiency, however, are economic concepts whose measurement requires both price 
information  and  the  imposition  of  an  appropriate  behavioral  objective  function  on 
producers  (Kumbhakar  and  Lovell,  2000).
  3 Farrell (1957) introduced the concept of frontier or “best practice” production func-
tion,  which  defines  the  maximum  output  attainable  from  a  given  vector  of  meas-
ured  inputs,  for  a  set  of  observations.Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 12
As an initial step to formulate the parametric approach, denote pro-
duction technology with the following function:
(1)  y = f(x)exp(-u),
where f(x) is a production frontier and exp(-u) is the value of the output dis-
tance function that is less than or equal to one. Thus, exp(-u) is often repre-
sented as the technical inefficiency score, i.e., the inefficiency of transforming 
inputs into output. Variations of technical efficiency are further assumed to cor-
relate with explanatory variables associated with the technical efficiency effects.  
For this purpose, the distribution for the technical efficiency term is modeled 
as a linear function of a set of explanatory variables.
IV. DATA AND VARIABLES
This study relies primarily upon farm-level data containing statistics associated 
with the special rice farmer survey administered by the Korea National 
Statistical Office. The survey is based on 1,209 randomly selected farms and 
collects rice specific production data and income support direct payments in 
20064.
Our data set is comprised of one output and four inputs. The output 
of rice is unhusked rice measured in kilogram. The inputs are land, labor, capi-
tal, and other inputs5. Land and labor are measured by quantities. Land is plant-
ed area measured by hectare. Labor is hours spent on farm work and includes 
both family labor and hired labor. Capital and other inputs are measured in val-
ue terms by won. Capital includes the average estimated replacement cost of 
structures, machinery depreciation, repairs, and leased farm equipment. Other 
inputs include expenditures on fertilizers, pesticides, fuel, electricity, seeds, and 
  4  The  data  used  in  this  paper  exclude  Jeju;  less  than  one  percent  of  farms  in  Jeju 
province  -  0.007%  -  produce  rice.
  5 The data collected on some inputs are in value terms rather than quantities. When 
input prices vary systematically over the period (changing in real terms) and across 
space,  the  data  in  value  terms  will  systematically  bias  the  estimation  results  due 
to  inflation  and  quality  differences  (Kwon  and  Lee,  2004).Impact of Direct Income Payments on Productive Efficiency of Korean Rice Farms 13
miscellaneous operating expenses. National level input-specific deflators rescale 
inputs in value terms. Through these processes, inputs become implicit 
quantities.
Descriptive statistics for the output and four inputs are summarized in 
Table 4, representing mean per farm household. The data confirm that rice 
farms in Korea are small, with an average landholding of 1.20 hectares per 
farm in the sample. The average farm is run by a part-time operator with about 
1,000 total hours of labor used, including both family and hired labor.





















Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Our data represent only the amounts of agricultural subsidies including 
both income support direct payment and other input subsidies. Even though our 
data cannot exactly divide the subsidies into income support direct payments 
and others, we regard the variable as direct payments because most government 
supports for rice farms are well-known as income support direct payments. The 
summary statistics for Tables 5 provide that the average direct payments tend 
to rise as farm size gets larger. This evidence results from the fact that fixed 
direct payments for Korean rice farms are tied to the amount of a farm’s crop-
land that has been enrolled in programs, as well as yield histories.
TA BLE  5.  Summary statistics of rice income support direct payments for rice farms
Unit: million won
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The distribution obtained by nonparametric kernel density is skewed to-
wards the left, indicating the presence of a large proportion of small direct pay-
ments and a smaller proportion of large direct payments6.
FIGURE  4.    Kernel  densities  for  income  support  direct  payments
To investigate the inequality of the direct payments by the direct pay-
ment types across rice farms, Gini coefficients by two types of the direct pay-
ment and contributions of each type on inequality are presented in Table 6.
The most widely used summary measure of the degree of inequality in 
income support direct payment distribution is the Gini coefficient. It represents 
an overall measure of the cumulative direct payment share against the share in 
TABLE  6.    Gini  Decomposition  by  types  of  income  support  direct  payments
Source Share of each type in 
total direct payments














  6 The distributions obtained by nonparametric kernel densities do not require arbitrary 
size class distinctions, as histograms  do. Also, the estimators  “let the  data speak” 
and  ensure  robustness  of  the  results  against  possible  misspecification.  The  flexi-
bility  in  the  estimates  facilitates  identification  of  salient  distribution  features.Impact of Direct Income Payments on Productive Efficiency of Korean Rice Farms 15
the population. The Gini Coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, 0 representing perfect 
equality and 1 total inequality.
The shares of variable and fixed direct payments in total direct pay-
ments are 0.467 and 0.533, respectively, which represent that the share of fixed 
direct payments is larger. 
The Gini coefficients for two types of direct payments indicate that 
both of them reveal unequal distributions. The inequality of fixed direct pay-
ments is especially more serious, indicating a higher share of fixed direct pay-
ments in total inequality.
V. EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
For empirical implementation, a functional form for the stochastic production 
function has to be chosen first. This study employs the translog functional form 
that has been adopted widely in frontier studies (Lovell et al., 1994; Grosskopf 
et al., 1997; Paul et al., 2000; Brmmer et al., 2002). The translog function al-
lows for a variety of possible production relationships including nonconstant re-
turns to scale, nonhomothetic production, and nonconstant elasticities of inputs.
A translog stochastic production function with one output and four in-
puts is specified as:








i x x x y
'
' ' 0 ln ln
2
1
ln ln β α α i i u v − +
where  n ' n ' nn β = β , v
i is the two-sided noise component following an iid
  normal 
distribution of zero mean and variance of 
2
v σ , and u
i represents the technical 
(in)efficiency of the ith producer. u
i (intended to capture technical efficiency in 
output) are assumed to be non-negative, independently distributed as truncations 
at zero of the  ) , (
2
u i N σ ω , where  i i K ' ϕ ω = ,  i K  is a vector of determinants of 
an individual farm’s efficiency, and ϕ  is a vector of parameters to be estimated 
(Battese and Coelli, 1995). Thus the means may be different for different farms 
but the variances are assumed to be the identical.
Having specified the production frontier, attention is now turned to fac-Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 16
tors influencing technical efficiency,  i K . Variations in the mean of technical ef-
ficiency  i ω  are assumed to correlate with relevant explanatory variables as7
(3) full f rent r i i i i i i D D Fpayment Dpayment Edu Age Size ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ω + + + + + + + = 3 3 3 2 1 0 ,
where  it Size  is farm size measured by paddy operated, and  i Age  and 
i Edu  are farm operator’s years of age and education8.  i Dpayment  is income 
support direct payments expressed as a share of the farm revenue, and 
i Fpayment  is an interaction term of direct payment share and farm size. Here, 
income support direct payments for rice farms consist of two types of direct 
payments, i.e., fixed and variable direct payments. Land rental dummies  rent D  
represent whether farm has land rented, and dummies  full D  represent whether 
farm operator is a full-time farmer. The parameter vector ϕ indicates the im-
pact of variables in  i K  on technical efficiency. 
Combining equations (2) and (3) yields a single-stage production fron-
tier model as,
(4)  i i i i u v x TL y − + = ) , , ( ln β α , and  i i i K u μ ϕ + = ' ,
where  i μ  are assumed to be independently distributed, obtained by truncation 
of the normal distribution with mean zero and unknown variance, 
2 σ , such that 
i u  is non-negative (i.e.,  i i K ' ϕ μ − ≥ ).
The parameters of the frontier production function are simultaneously 
estimated with those of the efficiency model, in which the technical efficiency 
effects are specified as a function of relevant variables. In other word, determi-
nants of technical efficiency are incorporated in an one-step model estimated 
with the stochastic production frontier function by maximum likelihood. 
Producer-specific estimates of technical inefficiency are then given by  } exp{
∧
− i u .
  7  In  most  empirical  studies,  conventional  inputs  such  as  land,  labor  and  capital  or 
their equivalents are usually included in the production function, with other varia-
bles  to  be  included  in  the  efficiency  function  (Tian  and  Wan,  2000).
  8  The  farm  size  variable  is  both  an  input  in  the  frontier  production  function  and  a 
factor associated with technical efficiency. A large number of studies use the same 
variable  in  the  production  function  and  in  the  efficiency  model  (e.g.,  Huang  and 
Liu,  1994;  Coelli  and  Battese,  1996;  Battese  and  Broca,  1997).Impact of Direct Income Payments on Productive Efficiency of Korean Rice Farms 17
VI. ESTIMATION RESULTS
This section first considers the preliminary step by presenting the results of the 
estimation of the rice production frontier, and then technical efficiency effects 
are discussed.
About 70 percent of the parameters in the frontier function are statisti-
cally significant at ten percent or lower level in Table 7. The wald-chi square 
test for significance of the regression rejects the null hypothesis that the co-
efficients of the explanatory variables are all zero at the one percent level.  The 
variance parameter 
2
u σ , which measures the relative importance of inefficiency, 
is statistically significant at the one percent level. The other variance parameter 
2
v σ , which indicates inherent randomness in production due to variations in 
weather and other conditions, is statistically significant at the one percent level.  
Statically significant two variance parameters confirm the importance of using 
the stochastic frontier approach to estimate the technical (in)efficiency.
TABLE  7.    Parameter  Estimates  of  the  Stochastic  Distance  Function
Variable Estimate Variable
Land β1 0.151 (0.0972)
Labor β2 0.593 (0.0980)*
Capital β3 -0.060 (0.0567)
Other β4 0.388 (0.0758)*
(Land)
2 β11 0.288 (0.0209)*
(Land)× (Labor) β12 -0.109 (0.0154)*
(Land)× (Capital) β13 -0.006 (0.0101)*
(Land)× (Other) β14 -0.162 (0.0132)*
(Labor)
2 β22 0.035 (0.0203)*
(Labor)× (Capital) β23 -0.016 (0.0090)**
(Labor)× (Other) β24 0.060 (0.0090)**
(Capital)
2 β33 0.012 (0.0071)
(Capital)× (Other) β34 0.036 (0.0077)
(Other)
2 β44 0.058 (0.0138)*




2  (14): 20959.3*
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 18
Table 8 displays regression results for the determinants of technical 
efficiency. The model for efficiency determinants is estimated with the pro-
duction frontier simultaneously.  Analysis concentrates on the impact of income 
support direct payment on technical efficiency in the context of rice production 
technology. We set two models according to the forms of the variable repre-
senting direct payment; one uses a share of direct payments in farm revenues, 
and the other uses the amount of direct payments themselves. The technical in-
efficiency scores, as measured relative to the technically efficient producers, are 
regressed against direct payments (or a share of direct payments), farm size, in-
teraction of direct payment (or a share of direct payments) and farm size, farm 
operator’s human capital variables such as years of age and education, land 
rental dummies, and full-time dummies.
The positive coefficient of farm size indicates that technical efficiency 
increases as farm size increases.  If farm size rises by one hectare, the technical 
efficiency score increases by about 9 percent. Farm consolidation leads to im-
provement of technical efficiency considerably.  
Human capital variables of farm operators are also important in ex-
plaining technical efficiency. Technical efficiency decreases as operator’s age 
increases. Highly educated operators are more likely to improve technical 
efficiency. These results confirm that the positive role of human capital on 
technical efficiency, outlined in productivity theory, is consistent with Korean 
agriculture.
A positive coefficient on the dummy variable, representing whether 
farms rent land or not, indicates that farms with rented land are more efficient 
than those with owned land. This result may be interpreted as either farming 
based on renting is more efficient than farming own land or farmland on the 
rental market being, in general, of better quality than farmland not on the rental 
market. A positive coefficient of dummy representing whether a farmer is a 
full-time worker denotes that a full-time farmer has higher technical efficiency 
relative to a part-time farmer.
We find that income support payments expressed as a share of the farm 
revenue have a negative impact on technical efficiency. Farms that get a higher 
share of direct payments in farm revenue are less efficient than others.   
However, this inefficiency is reduced by increases in farm size, and this is evi-
dent from positive and significant coefficient on the cross product of direct pay-
ment share and farm size.Impact of Direct Income Payments on Productive Efficiency of Korean Rice Farms 19
When the variable of a share of direct payment in farm revenue is sub-
stituted in the technical efficiency model II, the new result indicates that the 
farms that received greater direct payments on aggregate are more efficient than 
other farms. One part of rice direct payment, fixed payment, is tied to the 
amount of a farm’s cropland that has been enrolled in programs, as well as 
yield histories. As a result, farms that operate larger farmland of rice generally 
receive higher payments. In our sample, farms with less than 2ha (84 percent 
of total farms) received 62 percent of the payments in 2006. But, farms with 
more than 2ha (15 percent of total farms) received 38 percent of the payments. 
Furthermore, this positive impact on efficiency falls with an increase in farm 
size, that is, farms with a larger farm size get smaller efficiency benefits from 
the extra amount of direct payments than farms with smaller farms.
TABLE  8.    Regression  Results  For  the  Determinants  of  Technical  efficiency
Explanatory variable Model I Model II
Share of direct payments -0.0115
(0.0058)**


















Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels.
The variable ‘Rent’ denotes a land rental dummy variable representing whether 
farms rent land or not. The variable ‘Full-time’ denotes farm operator’s job 
status dummy variable representing whether operator is a full-time farmer or not.Journal of Rural Development 31(2) 20
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Despite the caution required in interpreting the results, we can draw some gen-
eral conclusions about the impact of direct payments on Korean rice productive 
efficiency for the period examined. The results found that farms with a higher 
share of direct payments in the farm revenue exhibited lower productive effi-
ciency and this inefficiency is reduced by increases in farm size, suggesting that 
the farms that have a strong dependence on direct payment in their farm income 
tend to be inefficient. However, larger farms with a higher direct payment share 
are more efficient than others, suggesting that direct payments help larger farms 
get closer to the frontier. On the other hand, we found that farms gaining great-
er direct payments are likely to be more efficient; however, this gain in effi-
ciency decreases with the fall in farm size. The direct payment for Korean rice 
farms is tied to the amount of a farm’s cropland that has been enrolled in pro-
grams; therefore, farms that operate larger farm size generally receive higher 
payments.
The empirical results indicate that income support direct payments help 
inefficient farms to stay in farming and, furthermore, suggest that the Korean 
rice industry can improve its technical efficiency and potential productivity by 
the exit of farms that get a higher share of direct payment in their farm 
revenue. The exit of inefficient farms will thus raise the average productivity 
of resources remaining in agriculture.
This paper also found that farmers with younger and higher schooling 
were more efficient than those with less human capital, implying that farmers 
with both less human capital and small farms are inefficient and will eventually 
exit the Korean agriculture sector.
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